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The Antitrust Implications of the Arab Boycott 
The Arab-Israeli conflict has not been limited to military con-
frontation. The Arab states have long engaged in a boycott of Jew-
ish economic interests in the Middle East.1 Since 1951, the League 
of Arab States2 has maintained a Central Boycott Office (with head-
quarters in Damascus and branches in League countries) to coor-
dinate boycott activities.3 Through a study of trade journals, the col-
lection of hearsay information, and the distribution of questionnaires 
to foreign companies, 4' the Office assembles a master list of busi-
nesses whose connections with Israel are considered detrimental to 
Arab interests. It disseminates the master list to member states, 
many of which have official boycott departments within their eco-
nomic or commercial government bureaucracy.5 Each country's 
government department then independently decides whether the 
League's recommendations should be implemented against partic-
ular foreign export, import, investment, or banking enterprises. 
1. See L. PREsroN, ThADB PATIERNS IN nm MIDDLE EAsT 49-51 (1970). For 
general discussion of the economic impact of boycott agreements, see Bouve, The Na-
tional Boycott as an International Delinquency, 28 AM. J. INTL. L. 19 (1934); Lau-
terpacht, Boycott in International Relations, 14 BRIT. Y.B. INTL. L. 125 (1933). 
2. See generally R. MACDONALD, THE LEAGUE OF .ARAB STATES (1965). 
3. L. PRESTON, supra note 1, at 51. 
4. The practice of demanding information through questionnaires was challenged 
in 1965 by a bill seeking to make any response to such questionnaires illegal. See 
generally 2 Hearings on S. 948 To Amend Section 2 of the Export Control Act of 
1949 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1965). The amendment finally approved by Congress encouraged, but did not man-
date, refusal to comply with boycotters' requests for information. See Export Ad-
ministration Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 2401-13 (Supp. 1975). It did require that such re-
quests from boycotters be reported to the Department of Commerce. Export Admin-
istration Act§ 4b, 50 U.S.C. § 2403(b) (Supp. 1975). 
Representative Holtzman states that from 1970 through 1974 exporters reported 
·44,709 transactions involving Arab requests for discriminatory practices against Is-
rael. 121 CONG. REc. H6580 (daily ed. July 10, 1975). There is little question that 
many more requests for information have gone unreported. On May 21, 1975, the 
Department of Commerce reported that at least 49 American exporters had violated 
· the Act by failing to disclose that· they had been asked to participate in the boycott. 
Five were formally charged for this failure. See N.Y. Times, May 22, 1975, at 8, 
col. 1 (late city ed.). More recently, the Department has demanded that companies 
report their responses to the boycott demands. See Detroit Free Press, Sept. 29, 
1975, at El, col. 1. An anonymous Department official has stated that, in most of 
the estimated 50,000 transactions with Arab countries since 1970, American com-
panies have complied with Arab demands. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1975, at 7, col. 
1 (late city ed.). The American Jewish Congress has filed suit in federal court de-
manding disclosure of the names of companies complying with the Arab boycott. See 
N.Y. Times, May 27, 1975, at 5, col. 1 (late city ed.). 
5. For example, in Lebanon the boycott office is part of the Ministry of National 
Economy. See G. GRASSMUCK & K. SALmI, REFORMED ADMINISTRATION IN LEBANON 
75 (1970). 
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According to official boycott regulations and policy statements, 
activities that can lead to blacklisting and subsequent boycotting in-
clude the maintenance of factories, assembly plants, agencies, or of-
fices in Israel, the sale of licenses, trademarks, or technical assistance 
to Israeli businesses, the use of parts or materials produced by a 
blacklisted firm, and the conduct of normal trade with Israel, partic-
ularly the importation of Israeli goods. 6 Although the boycott has 
never been a sham, 7 until recently it has been considered little more 
than a symbolic gesture of Arab unity against Israel. In part, this 
can be attributed to the haphazard implementation of the blacklist. 
Some companies on the list have never participated in activities viola-
tive of the boycott regulations, 8 while others conspicuous in their 
dealings with Israel have not been blacklisted.9 More importantly, 
however, the Arabs' limited economic power made the boycott rela-
tively ineffective. Western companies had little to lose if excluded 
from Arab markets. 
Since the Arab-Israeli War of October 1973, the Arab oil-pro-
ducing nations have emerged as a principal world economic force.10 
American businesses now have an interest in participating in the 
"petrodollar" bonanza of oil revenues-an interest that can best be 
furthered by joining in Arab construction projects, by exporting tech-
nology and goods, and by attracting Arab capital to be used for 
American business expansion. Not surprisingly, therefore, overt 
6. L. PREsToN, supra note 1, at 51-52. The regulations also proscribe foreign 
ships both from calling on Israeli ports before calling on Arab ports and from trans• 
porting Israeli goods. Foreign banks are prohibited from doing business in Arab 
lands if they establish outlets in Israel or do other business that involves substantial 
dealing with Israel. Id. at 52. 
7. A number of major corporations such as Coca-Cola Company and Ford Motor 
Company have been banned from the Arab world while their major competitors have 
been free to operate there. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1975, § 3, at 1, col. 3 (late 
city ed.). See also Guzzardi, That Curious Barrier on the Arab Frontier, FoRTIJNI!, 
July 1975, at 82. 
8. See Guzzardi, supra note 7, at 84-85. 
9. The most notable of these are Hilton International, Inc., which owns hotels in 
both Tel Aviv and Cairo (where Arab League meetings have been held), IBM, and 
the defense giants, General Electric and McDonald-Douglas. Id. at 168. 
10. The Arab-dominated Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) has become a force that Western statesmen can no longer ignore. It is esti-
mated that in 1974 OPEC revenues were $105 billion, $55 billion of which was avail-
able for foreign investment and $50 billion of which was used to purchase goods and 
services. See 121 CONG. REc. H6579-81 (daily ed. July 10, 1975) (testimony of Rep-
resentative Holtzman). . 
There is some evidence that high oil prices and the recession in the West have 
reduced the demand for oil, causing a drop in OPEC revenues in recent months. See 
Samuelson, Too Little Too Late, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 3, 1976, at 12. Still, it is pre-
dicted that over the next several years the Arab countries will accumulate vast sums 
of investment capital. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1975, at 2, col. 1 (late city ed.) (de· 
scribing massive Saudi Arabian development and construction projects planned for 
the next five years). See generally Demaree, Arab Wealth as Seen Through Arab 
Eyes, FoRTIJNE, April 1974, at 108; Arabs and Their Money-A Lot of Ways To 
Spend It, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 14, 1974, at 60. 
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acts of Arab pressure and American business compliance have be-
come more commonplace in recent months. A number of com-
panies are reported to be negotiating actively with the Arab Boycott 
Office about removal from the blacklist, 11 several have dropped their 
affiliations with the American-Israeli Chamber of Commerce,12 and 
a decrease in American investment in Israel has been noted.13 
Moreover, it has been alleged that American companies have been 
coerced into terminating economic dealings with other American 
companies on the blacklist,14 that businesses have attempted to 
purge themselves of Jewish directors, officers, and employees,15 and 
that anti-Jewish specifications have been filed with executive search 
firms.16 Finally, evidence that the Arabs have employed still other 
forms of coercion abroad17 suggests that American businesses may 
be subject to increasingly aggressive uses of Arab economic might 
in the future.18 
Clearly, American business practices are being interfered with, 
general principles of free trade are being th.warted, 19 United States 
foreign aid to Israel is being undermined, and the American econ-
omy is being threatened with the spread of discriminatory business 
practices.20 The complacency of the past must now be replaced by 
an appreciation of the dangers that the boycott poses to American 
economic and political institutions. 21 
11. These companies include Ford Motor Company, Xerox Corporation, and 
Coca-Cola Company. See Guzz.ardi, supra note 7, at 170, 172; N.Y. Times, Feb. 
24, 1975, at 7, col. 1 (late city ed.). 
12. Wall St. J., March 25, 1975, at 20, col. 2 (midwest ed.). 
13. Id. 
14. See N.Y. Times, March 29, 1975, at 44, col. 2 (late city ed.). 
15. Id. at 49, col. 3. Several private companies have been charged by the Anti-
Defamation League of B'nai B'rith with bowing to Arab demands that no Jews be 
sent to Saudi Arabia for any purpose. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1975, at 1, col. 4 
(late city ed.). 
16. See N.Y. Times, March 4, 1975, at 49, col. 3 (late city ed.). 
17. For example, N.M. 'Rothschild & Sons, S.G. Warburg & Co., and Lazard 
Freres were excluded from such projects as the raising of a $25 million loan to Air 
France and a $100 million fund to finance French highways. See N.Y. Times, iFeb. 
8, 1975, at 1, col. 2 (late city ed.). Similar practices were reported to be taking place 
in London. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1975, at 1, col. 5 (late city ed.). 
18. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1975, at 2, col. 1 (late city ed.). . 
19. The congressional declaration of policy in the Export Administration Act, 50 
U.S.C. § 2402 (1970), declares opposition to "restrictive trade practices or boycotts 
fostered or imposed by foreign countries against other countries friendly to the 
United ·States •... " 50 U.S.C. § 2402(5) (1970). For a discussion of United 
States efforts to encourage fewer restraints on world trade· generally; see Kintner, Jo-
elson & Vaghi, Groping for a Truly International Antitrust Law, 14 VA. J. •INTL. L. 
75 (1973). 
20. 121 CoNG. REc. H6579 (daily ed. July 10, 1975). Commissioner Pollack of 
the SEC has said that "no society can long exist if it permits itself to be blackballed 
or blacklisted by persons asserting economic leverage." N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1975, 
at 40, col. 1 (late city ed.). 
21. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1975, at 20, col. 1 (late city ed.); 121 CONG. REC. 
H6579 (daily ed. July 10, 1975). 
798 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 74:795 
This Note focuses on the legal means that can and should be 
used to challenge both the economic pressures exerted upon Amer-
ican companies and the subsequent participation by such companies 
in the boycott of Israel and blacklisted firms. The Note contends 
that, while "quiet diplomacy and persuasion"22 are perhaps the only 
means short of full-scale economic warfare available to the United 
States to eliminate completely Arab economic pressures and their co-
ercive effects, the United States antitrust laws are sufficient to coun-
teract many of the boycott's actual or potential manifestations.28 
Specifically, the Note demonstrates that the Arab boycott and the 
discriminatory conduct it induces are violative of the antitrust laws 
despite both the unique political purposes underlying the boycott and 
the presence of conspiratorial conduct abroad. It shows that the 
"sovereign immunity," "act of state," and "sovereign compulsion" 
doctrines are not defenses that generally can· shield American de-
fendants (and even some foreign entities) from antitrust prosecu-
tion. Finally, the Note concludes with the suggestion that new leg-
islation should be enacted to clarify possible ambiguities in the pres-
ent antitrust laws. 
I. APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS 
A. The Arab Boycott: An Illegal Concerted Refusal To Deal 
The initial question to be resolved is whether the refusal on the 
part of Arab states and American companies to deal with Israel and 
blacklisted firms violates section 1 of the Sherman Act, which pro-
scribes any "combination ... in restraint of trade or commerce."24 
Boycott agreements are generally understood to be illegal per se 
under section 1. 25 .As a review of the leading cases indicates, crucial 
in the determination whether a refusal to deal constitutes an illegal 
boycott are the exercise of coercive methods and a resultant restraint 
on freedom of trade. ~6 For example, in Eastern States Retail Lum-
ber Dealersl Association v. Untted States, 27 retailers who compiled 
22. N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1975, at 16, col. 5 (late city ed.). 
23. On January 16, 1975, the Justice Department 'decided to test this use of the 
antitrust laws by filing suit against Bechtel Corporation and four related companies 
for conspiracy to boycott individuals and companies blacklisted by Arab nations. The 
Department alleged that the defendants had ·conspired since early 1971 " 'to refuse 
to deal with blacklisted persons as subcontractors in connection with major construc-
tion projects in Arab League countries.'" N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1976, at 5, col. 3 
(late city ed.). 
24. 15 u.s.c. § 1 (1970). 
25. 15 u.s.c. § 1 (1970). 
26. See A. NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAws OF THE UNITED SrATES OF AMERICA 73 
(2d ed. 1960); J. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAws AND TRADE REGULATION § 61.03 
(1) (1972); Barber, Refusals To Deal Under the Federal Antitrust Law, 103 U. PA, 
L. REV. 847, 873 (1955). 
27. 234 U.S. 600 (1914). 
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a blacklist and then refused to deal with wholesalers who sold di-
rectly to consumers. The Supreme Court held that when a dealer, 
through a conspiracy and combination with others, seeks to "obstruct 
the free course of interstate trade and commerce and to unduly sup-
press .competition by placing obnoxious wholesale dealers under the 
coercive influence of a condemnatory report circulated among . . . 
actual or possible customers of the offenders, he exceeds his lawful 
rights. . .. "28 
Similarly, in Klors, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.,29 the Su-
preme Court held illegal a combination among a large retail store 
and its suppliers, wherein the suppliers agreed to sell merchandise 
to the retailer's competitor only at discriminatory prices or on highly 
unfavorable terms. The Court emphasized that such a combination 
deprived the plaintiff of 
its freedom to buy . . . in an open competitive market ,and [tended 
to drive] it out of business as a dealer in the defendants' products. 
It deprived the manufacturers and distributors of their freedom to 
sell to ,[the plaintiff] at the same prices and conditions made available 
-to [its competitor], and in some instances forbade them from selling 
to it on any terms whatsoever. It interfered with the natural flow 
of interstate commerce. 30 
This concern for the market consequences of coercive pressures is 
perhaps most clearly articulated in Duplex Printing Press Co. v. 
Deering.31 There, union representatives pressured the complain-
ant's actual and prospective customers "to withhold or withdraw pa-
tronage from [the] complainant"32 in order to force the acceptance 
of union demands. The Court held •that such a "secondary 
boycott" must be enjoined because it acts "to the great and incal-
culable damage of many innocent people far remote from any con-
nection with or control over the original and actual dispute-people 
constituting, indeed, the general public upon whom the cost must 
ultimately fall, and whose vital interest in unobstructed commerce 
constituted the prime and paramount concern of Congress in enacting 
the antitrust laws ..•. "83 
Surely the compilation of a blacklist by the Arabs amounts to a 
coercive attempt to restrain trade and to alter trade patterns, conduct 
found illegal in Eastern States. The Arab and American refusal to 
deal also infringes upon the freedom of manufacturers and distrib-
28. 234 U.S. at 614. 
29. 359 U.S. 207 (1959). 
30. 359 U.S. at 213. 
31. 254 U.S. 443 (1921). 
32. 254 U.S. at 466. 
33. 254 U.S. at 477-78. See also Lowe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 294 (1908) 
(holding illegal a combination "aimed at compelling third parties and strangers invol-
untarily not to engage in the course of trade except on conditions that the combina-
tion imposes ••• "). 
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utors to sell, and thereby interferes with the freedom of both Ameri-
can and Israeli targets to purchase goods and technology on the open 
m,arket, consequences crucial to the decision in Klors. Finally, the 
coercive pressure exerted by the Arabs against American firms con-
stitutes a secondary boycott of the sort condemned in Deering; it is, 
after all, "the general public upon whom the cost must ultimately 
fall." It thus appears that both the Arab entities and the American 
companies that act in concert with them are engaging in activities 
generally found illegal per se under the Sherman Act. 
The analysis, however, cannot end here, for concerted refusals 
to deal are almost universally intended to create direct economic or 
competitive advantages for the boycotters. 34 In contrast, the Arab 
boycott involves atypical purposes. The Arab participants seek to 
"'advance political or military purposes, while the American partici-
pants act on the basis of business calculation in response to threats 
of Arab economic retaliation. It therefore becomes necessary to de-
termine whether uniqueness of purpose requires a rejection of the 
per se approach to coercive restraints of trade. 
While few courts have had to face the problem, as both Council 
of Defense v. International Magazine Co.35 and I.P.C. Distributors, 
Inc. v. Chicago Moving Picture Machine Operators Union86 demon-
strate, the antitrust laws have been applied to restraints of trade that 
are not motivated by the promise of economic benefit to the boycot-
ters. 37 In Council of Defense, a patriotic organization was held in 
violation of the antitrust laws for conspiring to boycott and restrain 
the sale of Hearst magazines in New Mexico. The specific conduct 
complained of was the launching of a publicity campaign designed to 
condemn the magazines and praise those retailers that no longer 
marketed them. Part of the campaign involved the publication of 
an "Honor Roll" of "real Americans" who no longer sold the objec-
tionable magazine. 88 No competitive relationship or purpose influ-
enced the defendants. They were motivated by apparently sincere 
feelings that the Hearst Corporation was pro-German and that its 
periodicals undermined the American war effort. Nevertheless, the 
court, citing as authority a number of cases in which the combination 
had taken place in a typical economic setting, 39 held that the acts 
"amounted to a conspiracy to boycott or blacklist the magazines" and 
34. See Coons, Non-Commercial Purpose as a Sherman Act Defense, 56 Nw. 
U. L. RE.v. 705, 727 (1962). 
35. 267 F. 390 (8th Cir. 1920). 
36. 132 F. Supp. 294 (N.D. Ill. 1955). 
31. See also Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Inc. v. A.G. Corp., 
241 S.2d 619 (Miss. 1970) (consumer boycott of grocery store was an unlawful con-
spiracy notwithstanding that boycotters' purpose was to force store to abandon alleged 
discriminatory hiring policy). 
38. 267 F. at 396. 
39. 267 F. at 396. 
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were thus illegal.40 In I.P.C. Distributors, union operators had 
refused to run a film distributed by the plaintiff to a local theater 
because one of the stars was on a blacklist of alleged communist sym-
pathizers. The court similarly ignored tµe boycotters' lack of eco-
nomic motivation and found a sufficient cause of action under the 
antitrust laws based solely on the public's interest in being able to 
· see first-run movies.41 
In these cases, patriotic and political purposes did not prompt 
the courts to look beyond coercion and restraint of trade. They 
stand as authority that the e~stence of noneconomic purposes cannot 
vitiate a finding of illegality under the Sherman Act. If such an ap-
proach wer_e adopted by courts in litigation involving Arab partici-
pants in the boycott against Israel and American companies, the co-
ercive effects of that boycott would require a finding of per se ille-
gality. 42 
40. 267 F. at 411-12. 
41. 132 F. Supp. at 298. For a discussion and background of motion picture 
political blacklisting, see Note, "Political" Blacklisting in the Motion Picture Industry: 
A Sherman Act Violation, 74 YALE L.J. S61 (196S). 
42. There are, of course, problems with embracing a comprehensive rule that po-
litical purposes can -never excuse coercive conduct that results in restraint of trade. 
Such a rule would make per se illegal the refusal of Black citizens to buy from a 
retail store that discriminates against Blacks in its hiring practices, the ·boycott of 
Japanese products by Americans concerned about the extinction of the whale, and 
the consumer boycott of Gallo wine or California lettuce. Although these acts are 
at least minimally coercive and result in restraint of trade, the yalue of free political 
expression makes automatic application of the Sherman Act in these settings ques-
tionable indeed. 
It might therefore be desirable for courts to adopt a more refined analysis when 
dealing with political purposes, one that would accommodate certain forms of eco-
nomic coercion in limited settings. It would seem consistent with the thrust of leading 
boycott cases to reserve a per se rule in any secondary boycott situation in which 
coercive pressure, as opposed to persuasion, is placed on parties neutral to the dispute 
between the initiating boycotters and their primary target. Using this approach, a 
secondary boycott of a store selling Gallo wine would be illegal, while a consumer 
boycott of the wine itself would at least escape a finding of per se illegality. In the 
Arab boycott context, this approach would assure a finding of illegal coercive re-
straint of trade in any case involving a blacklisted American company. Under such 
an approach, only the primary dispute between the Arab states and Israel could avoid 
a finding of per se illegality-a result having linuted importance since the major con-
cern of American courts should be coercion directed against Americans or coercion 
exercised by Americans. 
A second approach to refusals to deal might also be adopted to accommodate both 
the individual's interest in political expression and the public's interest in freedom 
of trade: A per se rule could be applied to combinations of businesses, while a "rule 
of reason" could be applied to combinations of individuals when no secondary coer-
cion is involved. Businesses have no compelling need for freedom of political expres-
sion, and the economic impact of their refusals to deal may often be great. Thus, 
the per se rule is appropriate. Individuals, on the other hand, should be permitted 
to show that their purposes are somehow consonant with the protection of jnterests 
recognized in American law. Thus, the interest of Blacks to mobiliz.e politically to 
secure civil rights is manifestly a r~cognized one. See, e.g., Henry v. First Natl. 
Bank of Clarksdale, SO F.R.D. 251 (1970). The same would seem true for the pro-
tection of environmental interests, labor interests, see Coons, supra note 34, at 733-
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A similar approach should be adopted with regard to the Ameri-
can participants. As noted above, American companies participate 
in the boycott on the basis of business calculations. Thus, it must 
be determined whether a finding of per se illegality is appropriate, 
given that the courts occasionally have permitted combinations in re-
straint of trade to be excused for legitimate business purposes. For 
example, in Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & 
Liquors, Ltd., 43 a supplier had allegedly terminated a distributor in 
order to transfer all wholesale rights to a rival distributor. The court 
held that there was no antitrust violation since the manufacturer's 
reason for the termination was to improve the distribution of 
its products. Similarly, a line of cases has established the right 
of trade associations to pass regulations concerning the behavior of 
their members and to establish legitimate standards for admission or 
exclusion. 44 
This limited business purpose exception to per se application of 
the Sherman Act in concerted refusal to deal cases should not be 
applied to American participants in the Arab boycott. In the first 
place, Seagram and the other cases recognizing the exception did 
not involve secondary boycotts. In fact, the court in Seagram ques-
tioned whether a combination that excluded one distributor in favor 
of another involved coercion at all in the sense understood by Klors 
and related cases. 45 _Clearly, American firms that refuse to deal with 
34, religious interests, see, e.g., Watch Tower Bible & Tract Soc. v. Dougherty, 337 
Pa. 286, 11 A.2d 147 (1940), and many other purposes that might stimulate con-
sumer combinations. Even under this test, which should be an easy one to meet, 
the Arab purpose of undermining the economy of a nation with the ultimate aim of 
eliminating that nation from the world scene would hardly seem legitimate. 
43. 416 F.2d 71, 76 (9th Cir. 1969). 
44. See, e.g., Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v. National BankAmericard Inc., 485 
F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918 (1974) (defendant's bylaws pre-
venting a card-issuing member bank from becoming a card-issuing member of rival 
credit system held not per se illegal because the bylaws advanced legitimate economic 
purposes necessary to the functioning of such credit card systems); Dalmo Sales Co. 
v. Tysons Comer Regional Shopping Center, 308 F. Supp. 98'8 (D.D.C.), affd., 429 
F.2d 206 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (shopping center could exclude competitor from member-
ship in order to maintain the center's ''fashion image"); Molinas v. National Basket-
ball Assn., 190 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (permanent suspension of plaintiff 
from the association for violating no-gambling regulation held a legitimate disciplin-
ary rule); Hughes Tool Co. v. Motion Picture Assn. of America, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 
1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1946) (removal by the association of a seal of approval from a mem-
ber's film and refusal to promote the film held consistent with proper self-regulatory 
and moral censorship). 
45. In all these cases, the courts distinguished the justifiable characteristics of the 
conduct of the combiners from that which characterizes illegal combination. For ex-
ample, the court in Seagram cited with approval the remarks of Barber, supra note 
26, at 103: 
The issue in these cases is not the existence or nonexistence of concerted refusals 
to deal, but rather whether the purpose and effect of the operation of the con-
tract, association, exchange or joint sales agency was such as unreasonably to 
exclude outsiders from participation in the trade in question. The principle of 
the group boycott cases-that it is prima facie unreasonable for a dominant 
group to combine to coerce-is not here applicable. 
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blacklisted American targets are engaging in a secondary boycott. 
And, whatever the business purposes behind refusing to deal with 
Israel, those companies form an avowedly coercive enterprise. 
Moreover, American courts have consistently refused to recognize 
economic coercion as an affirmative defense in wholly domestic anti-
trust cases. 46 Although there are valid reasons for applying a discre-
tionary test in some situations in which economic coercion is exer-
cised by foreign sovereigns, as in the Arab case, this test should be 
applied to American participants not at the outset, in deciding 
whether there is an antitrust violation, but at a later stage, in evaluat-
ing the affirmative defense of sovereign compulsion. 47 
B. Extraterritoriality 
The Arab boycott involves two distinct components: (1) the 
secondary boycott by Arab entities directed against American com-
panies, and (2) the boycott by Arab entities and American com-
panies directed against Israel or blacklisted American companies. 
Although the activities of both components illegally restrain trade, 
the fact that such activities involve foreign parties and are conducted, 
at least in part, outside th~ United States suggests that the boycott 
may not be subject to the jurisdiction of the antitrust laws. It is 
therefore necessary to assess the applicability of established princi-
ples of extraterritoriality to the Arab boycott. 
It is clear that the Sherman Act does extend to the combined 
boycott activities of the Arab entities and American companies since 
it is a well-established rule that federal laws have extraterritorial ap-
plication where some of the parties are American and some of the 
illegal activity occurs within the United States.48 In the Arab-Amer-
ican combination to restrain trade, much of the activity, including 
corporate decision-making and the making and breaking of sales or 
investment deals, has a physical situs within the United States. Sim-
ilar conspiratorial activities within American borders were found by 
the Supreme Court to trigger extraterritoriality in United States v. 
Sisal Sales Corp.49 In Sisal, American banks had planned and effec-
tuated manipulations of the sisal market in order to monopolize the 
production, importation, and sale of that Mexican-produced fiber. 
As the Court explained: 
416 F.2d at 77-78. It should be clear that all these cases where combinations are 
either per se illegal or subject to the rule of reason involve business purposes having 
nothing in common with the intent and conduct of the Arab boycott against Israel. 
46. See text at notes 120-22 infra. 
41. See text at notes 106-27 infra. 
48. See, e.g., United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927); Sabre Ship-
ping Corp. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 285 F. Supp. 949, 954 (S.D.N.Y. 
1968), affd., 401 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 922 (1969). 
49. 274 U.S. 268 (1927). 
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Here we have a contract, combination and conspiracy entered into 
by parties within the United States and made effective by acts done 
therein . . . . The United States complain of a violation of their 
laws within their own territory by parties subject to their jurisdiction. 
. . . [B]y their own deliberate acts, here and elsewhere, {the de-
fendants] brought about forbidden results within the United States. 
They are within the jurisdiction of our courts and may be punished 
for offenses against our laws.50 
The fact that some of the Arab boycott activities occur outside 
the United States does not remove the conspiracy from the extrater-
ritorial application of the federal antitrust laws. In Sisal, Mexican 
legislative enactments regulating the supply and marketing of sisal 
were necessary to , effectuate the conspiracy. Similarly, in Conti-
nental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 111 the Supreme 
Court held that a conspiracy between an American corporation and 
its Canadian subsidiary to monopolize the vanadium market was sub-
ject to the antitrust laws because of the parent corporation's conduct 
within the United States. Though the conspiracy was consummated 
in Canada, the Court concluded that a "conspiracy to monopolize 
or restrain the domestic or foreign commerce of the United States 
is not outside the reach of the Sherman Act just because part of the 
conduct complained of occurs in foreign countries."52 Thus, where 
American companies yield to Arab pressures and combine with Arab 
entities to alter United States-Israeli trade patterns, such conduct will 
bring the parties within the jurisdiction of the federal antitrust 
laws. 
Although it is less clear that the secondary boycott activities of 
Arab entities against American companies have an American situs, 
they too can be reached by the rule that 'antitrust jurisdiction extends 
to conspiratorial activity, whatever the situs, that intends to and does 
affect United States commerce. As the Second Circuit declared in 
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 53 "(A]ny state may im-
pose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for con-
duct outside its borders that has consequences within its borders 
which the state reprehends; and these liabilities other states will or-
dinarily recognize."54 The court held that the Sherman Act should 
be applicable to any conspiracy that is intended to and does affect 
United States imports and exports, if such conspiracy would be illegal 
if perpetrated within the United States. 55 Subsequent decisions have 
SO. 274 U.S. at 276. 
51. 370 U.S. 690 (1962). 
52. 370 U.S. at 704. Continental and Sisal effectively overrule American Ba-
nana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1908), which had completely denied 
the reach of federal antitrust laws to acts taking place outside of the United States. 
53. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
54. 148 F.2d at 443. 
55. 148 F.2d at 444. See also United States v. General Blee. Co., 82 F. Supp. 
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affirmed that the rule applies to conduct abroad affecting either ex-
ports or imports, 56 that the character of the restraint of trade and 
not the amount of commerce affected is determinative of illegality,57 
and that no effect on prices within the United States need be alleged 
to make the restrictive conduct illegal per se. 58 
Thus, the Sherman Act should be applicable to the activities of 
Arab entities directed against blacklisted American companies. The 
intention of diverting American trade and investment from Israel has 
been admitted openly by Arab leaders. 59 In addition, the boycott 
has the actual effect of excluding many exporters from Arab markets 
and rearranging trade patterns between the United States and the 
Middle East. If nothing else, the exclusion of large corporations 
such as Ford Motor Company and Coca-Cola Company60 from Arab 
states should be a sufficient basis for the extraterritorial application 
of the antitrust laws. 61 In sum, therefore, both components of the 
Arab boycott should be within the jurisdiction of American courts. 
II. .ARAB AND AMERICAN DEFENSES TO 
ANTITRUST VIOLATIONS 
A. Sovereign Immunity 
Notwithstanding that a cause of action under the Sherman Act 
clearly exists, the various parties to the Arab boycott may be able 
to avoid application of that statute. An initial defense that might 
shield at least some parties to the boycott is the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity, which prevents American courts from entertaining suits 
against certain foreign entities. 62 In order to determine whether this 
defense can be asserted successfully by any of the participants, it is 
necessary to examine separately the status of the three types of Arab 
753, 890 (D.N.J. 1949), modified, 115 F. Supp. 835 (D.N.J. 1953). 
This part of the Alcoa decision has been criticized by American and foreign com-
mentators for exceeding justifiable boundaries of jurisdiction under international law, 
but it has been honored as a rule of American law by American courts in antitrust 
cases. See Raymond, A New Look at the Jurisdiction in Alcoa, 61 AM. J. INTL. L. 
558 (1967). 
56. See, e.g., Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 285 F. 
Supp. 949 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), atfd., 407 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 39-5 U.S. 992 
(1969). 
57. See, e.g., United States v. Bayer Co., 135 F. Supp. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). 
58. See, e.g., Todhunter-Mitchell & Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 610 
(E.D. Pa. 1974). 
59. See N.Y. Tinles, Feb. 17, 1975, at 9, col 1 (late city ed.). 
60. See note 7 supra. 
61. Such exclusion would most certainly meet the standard adopted by REsTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF THB FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THB UNITED STATES§ 18 (1965) 
[hereinafter R.EsTATBMBNT], which modifies the Alcoa decision by requiring that the 
effect within the territory of the United States be substantial and occur as a direct 
and foreseeable result of the conduct outside of the United States. 
62. See generally id. § 65. 
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entities involved in the boycott: states and state officials, govern-
ment corporations, and international organizations. 
The general principle that sovereign immunity protects a state 
from the application of another state's laws would undoubtedly shield 
Arab heads of state, economic or trade officials, and officers in gov-
ernment boycott offices responsible for the blacklist. The defense 
extends not only to states, but also to ministers and agents of states 
with respect to acts performed in an official capacity.63 In two re-
cent cases involving fact situations somewhat analogous to the Arab 
boycott, such immunity was apparently_ assumed. Thus, in Occi-
dental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 64 where the Ameri-
can corporate defendant was accused of conspiring with Iran, Britain, 
and the Trucial States to deprive the plaintiff of oil concessions in 
the Persian Gulf, the.states were never joined as parties. Similarly, 
in Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, 05 the Vene-
zuelan Ministry of Hydrocarbons, which had ordered the corporate 
defendants not to deal with the plaintiff, was not joined as a defend-
ant. aa 
The applicability of the doctrine of sovereign immunity to institu-
tions such as the Kuwait International Investment Company, which 
has unusual status as a branch of the national government and an 
entity active in world financial affairs, is less certain. Immunity gen-
erally does not extend to foreign corporations, 67 although it might, 
under some circumstances, extend to "a corporation created under 
[a foreign state's] laws and exercising functions comparable to those 
of an agency of the state."68 The justification for not recognizing 
corporate immunity was clearly articulated in United States v. 
63. See id. §§ 65-66. A statement of May 19, 1952, by the Acting Legal Adviser 
of the Department of State explained: 
According to the new or restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, the immunity 
of the sovereign is recognized with regard to sovereign or public acts (Jure Im-
peril) of a state, but not with respect to private acts (Jure Gestionis). There 
is agreement • • . that sovereign immunity should not be claimed or granted in 
actions with respect to real property ( diplomatic and perhaps consular property 
excepted) or with respect to the disposition of the property of a deceased person 
even though a foreign sovereign is the beneficiary. 
Id. §§ 65-66. See generally Bishop, New United States Policy Limiting Sovereign 
Immunity, 41 AM. J. !Nn,. L. 93 (1953). 
64. 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972). 
65. 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970). 
66. In lnteramerican, the court stated that the Sherman Act "does not confer ju-
risdiction on United States courts over acts of foreign sovereigns. By its terms, it 
forbids only anti-competitive practices of persons and corporations." 307 F. Supp. 
at 1298. Although, as will be demonstrated below, the court confused sovereign im-
munity with the act of state doctrine, the holding with regard to jurisdiction over for-
eign sovereigns seems correct 
67. See, e.g., Coale v. Societe Co-operative Suisse des Charbons, Basie, 21 F.2d 
180 (S.D.N.Y. 1921); Hannes v. Kingdom of Roumania Monopolies Inst., 260 App. 
Div. 189, 20 N.Y.S.2d 825 (1940). 
68. RllsTATEMENT, supra note 61, § 66(g). 
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Deutsche Kalisyndikat Gessellschaft. 69 Although the defendant 
corporation there was created, controlled, and largely owned by the 
French government, and although the corporate proceeds were paid 
into the national treasury and used for government purposes, the 
court did not consider the corporation to be "identical in any respect" 
with France, and it thus refused to recognize immunity: 
A foreign sovereign cannot authorize his agents to violate -the law 
in a foreign jurisdiction, or to perform any sovereign or govern-
mental functions within the domain of another sovereign, without 
his consent. He, therefore, cannot claim as a matter of comity or 
otherwise that the act of the alleged agent in such cases is the act 
of the sovereign, and that a suit against the agent is in fact a suit 
against the sovereign. This is especially so when such alleged agent 
is a foreign corporation, or an officer, agent, or employee of a for-
eign corporation which is doing business here only by consent, 
which cannot be assumed ·to be given, except on condition that they 
shall be subject to our laws.70 
Ultimately, the denial of sovereign immunity to foreign corpora-
tions is necessary to protect fundamental United States interests. If 
immunity were recognized, foreign corporations would possess the 
rights and privileges associated with commercial intercourse, includ-
ing the right to sue 1n United States courts, and yet would be able 
to escape the enforcement of United States laws and regulations. 
American corporations would thus be placed at a competitive disad-
vantage, and both American corporations and individuals would be 
left remediless if injured by the activities of foreign corporations.71 
Arab corporations, such as the Kuwait International Investment 
Company, should therefore be subject to the antitrust laws of the 
United States. 
The final Arab entity participating in the boycott-the Arab 
League-should also not be able to invoke- the defense of sovereign 
immunity. The International Organizations Immunities Act72 pro-
vides immunities equal to those enjoyed by foreign states only to 
public international organizations in which the United States partici-
pates, and no recent judicial decisions have granted immunity from 
69. 31 F.2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1929). 
70. 31 F.2d at 203. This case cannot be seen as conclusive authority upon 
which to base refusal to grant sovereign immunity to the Kuwait International Invest-
ment Company and entities like it since the defendant did have some private stock-
holders and sold products for others, as well as for the government. However, the 
court was impressed with the argument that the company had an existence distinct 
from that of its stockholders, which seems to imply that even complete government 
ownership inight not create sovereignty. See also Coale v. Societe Co-operative 
Suisse des Charbons, Basle, 21 F.2d 180, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (holding that, where 
the Swiss government did business by means of a corporation organized by the gov-
ernment, the corporation "as a corporate entity, was liable for its corporate obliga-
tions"). 
71. See T. GIUTARRI, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SoVE.REIGN lMMuNrrY 107-09, 128-
29 n.10 (1970). 
72. 22 u.s.c. § 288 (1970). 
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American laws to an international organization in the absence of an 
agreement between the organization and the federal government. 
The United States is not a member of the Arab League nor has it 
any treaties in force with the League, and it would be clearly unrea-
sonable to maintain that the United States has in any way consented 
to the League's boycott activities. 73 Thus, the Arab League and its 
boycott offices should not be shielded by the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity. 
B. Act of State 
Although neither American corporations nor some foreign enti-
ties participating in the Arab boycott can invoke the protection of 
sovereign immunity, they might, because of the involvement of for-
eign sovereigns in the conspiracy, be able to invoke the act of state 
doctrine to escape application of the antitrust laws.74 It is submitted, 
however, that the act of state doctrine is inapposite to the Arab boy-
cott. First, only a few cases have applied the doctrine in the anti-
trust context, 75 and the authority of these cases appears to be vitiated 
by contrary decisions of the Supreme Court. 76 Second, the "acts" 
of the Arab sovereigns can be distinguished from the sovereign 
"acts" in those cases that have applied the doctrine. Finally, the 
policies underlying the act of state doctrine would not be furthered 
by applying the doctrine to the Arab boycott. 
The most recent application of the' act of state doctrine to anti-
trust litigation was in Occidental Petroleum, 77 where the American 
defendant was charged with conspiring to induce the Trucial States 
to claim territory in and to exclude a competitor from the Persian 
Gulf. The court refused to consider the antitrust claims against the 
American corporate defendant on the ground that "the act of state 
doctrine surely bars" judicial inquiry into the "authenticity" and "mo-
tivations" of the acts of foreign sovereigns. 78 
As authority for its holding, the Occidental Petroleum court re-
lied almost exclusively on the early Supreme Court decision in 
73. Consent would be one way of creating immunity. See RllsTATEMENT, supra 
note 61, § 83(2). 
74. This doctrine applies solely to acts of sovereign states, such as Egypt, Syria, 
and Kuwait, and not to acts of organizations affiliated with those states, such as the 
League of Arab States. The conduct of the League can therefore be scrutinized fully 
by American courts. See text at notes 50-61 supra. For examples of the types of 
sovereign acts required to invoke the act of state doctrine, see Victory Transp. Inc. 
v. Comisaria General de Abostecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354, 363 (2d Cir. 
1964); Menzel v. List, 49 Misc. 2d 300, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804 (Sup. Ct. 1966). 
15. See American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909); Occi-
dental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Corp., 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 1971 ). 
76. See Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 
(1962); United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927). 
77. 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 1971). 
78. 331 F. Supp. at 110. 
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American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.79 The complaint in 
American Banana alleged that the defendant, in ari attempt to mo-
nopolize, had induced the government of Costa Rica to seize the 
plaintiff's banana plantation. The Court concluded that it could not 
find that acts committed within the jurisdiction of Costa Rica, a for-
eign sovereign, were illegal since such acts were not proscribed by 
that sovereign: "[A] seizure by a state is not a thing that can be 
complained of elsewhere in the courts . . . . [IJt is a contradiction 
in terms to say that within its jurisdiction it is unlawful to persuade 
a sovereign power to bring about -a result that it declares by its con-
duct to be desirable and proper."80 Although it acknowledged that 
Sisal81 and Continental Ore82 overruled American Banana on the 
issue of the extraterritoriality of United States antitrust laws, 83 the 
Occidental Petroleum court maintained that American Banana re-
mains authority for the contention that "the act of state doctrine bars 
a claim for antitrust injury flowing from foreign sovereign acts alleg-
edly induced and procured by the defendant."84. This continued re-
liance on American Banana seems misplaced, however, given the 
fact that in neither Sisal nor Continental Ore did the Supreme Court 
apply the act of state doctrine despite the active involvement in each 
of a foreign sovereign in the conspiracy.811 
Even if American Banana remains good authority for applying 
the act of state doctrine to some antitrust cases, "it should not be con-
strued to validate the doctrine's application in all antitrust contexts. 
An analysis of both antitrust and nonantitrust cases in which the doc-
trine has been invoked indicates that it has been applied only where 
the sovereign's acts are within its own territory86 and involve either 
the seizure of property, decrees that affect personal rights, or the 
implementation of domestic economic programs. 87 Most of these 
cases have involved acts of confiscation by the sovereign that 
result in subsequent disputes over the title or proceeds from 
the sale of property.88 American courts have consistently re-
fused to examine the validity of acts such as the confiscation of 
79. 213 U.S. 347 (1909). 
80. 213 U.S. at 357-58. 
81. 274 U.S. 268 (1!>27). 
82. 370 U.S. 690 (1962). 
83. 331 F. Supp. at 110. 
84. 331 F. Supp. at 109. 
85. See notes 49-52 supra and accompanying text. For a discussion of the con-
troversy over the current authority of American Banana, compare W. FuoA.TB, FoR-
EIGN COMMERCE AND nm .ANTITRUST LA.ws 76-78 (rev. ed. 1973), with Calvani, 
Book Review, 74 MICH. L. REV. 164, 169-74 (1975). 
86. See, e.g., Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 303 (1918); Underhill 
v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897); F. Palicio y Compania, S.A. v. Brush, 256 
F. Supp. 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 830 (1967). 
81. See Annot., 12 AL.R. Fed. 707 (1972). 
88. See, e.g., Ricaud v. American Metal Co., Ltd., 246 U.S. 304 (1918). 
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hides89 and gold bullion90 by military forces during the Mexican Civil 
War, and the seizure by the Cuban government of sugar91 and a to-
bacco factory. 92 In a few cases, the doctrine has been applied to 
sovereign acts of ·domestic administration that affect the personal 
rights of individuals within the sovereign's territory. Thus, in the 
leading case of Underkill v. Hernandez,98 the Supreme Court re-
fused to adjudicate the right of the commander of a revolutionary 
army in Venezuela (later the recognized government) to refuse the 
plaintiff a passport to leave an occupied city.94 Similarly, American 
courts have refused to consider claims involving the validity of a 
CJsta Rican revocation of citizenship911 or a German revocation of 
pension rights.96 Finally, the act of state doctrine has been applied 
in some cases involving sovereign acts of economic regulation. Thus, 
in Wells Fargo & Co., Express, S.A. v. Tribolet,97 the court allowed 
invocation of the doctrine to bar scrutiny of a Mexican state's enact-
ment of regulations governing the organization of vegetable produc-
tion and marketing within Mexico. 98 
The general rule that appears to govern these cases is that Amer-
ican courts will allow invocation of the act of state doctrine when 
the sovereign's acts are not intended to have extraterritorial effects 
( even though the acts may have "some indirect impact" beyond the 
sovereign's boundaries99) and when the acts can be completed by 
89. See, e.g., Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918). 
90. See, e.g., Ricaud v. American Metal Co., Ltd., 246 U.S. 304 (1918). 
91. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). 
92. See F. Palacio y Compania, S.A. v. Brush, 256 F. Supp. 481 (S.D.N.Y. 
1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 830 (1967) (refusing to question either Cuban owner-
ship of the factory or rights to proceeds from the sale of cigars). 
The right to invoke the act of state doctrine in cases of nationalization of prop• 
erty by a sovereign was sharply curtailed in the so-called "Sabbatino Amendment" 
to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, which stated: 
[N]o court in the United States shall decline on the grounds of the federal act 
of state doctrine to make a determination on the merits giving effect to the prin-
ciples of international law in a case in which a claim of title or other right to 
property is asserted by any party including a foreign state ( or a party claiming 
through such a state) based upon (or traced through) a confiscation or other 
taking after January 1, 1959, by an act of that state in violation of·the principles 
of international law . . . • 
22 U.S.C. § 2370(e) (1970). The court in Banco Nacio.nal de Cuba v. First Natl, 
City Bank of N.Y., 431 F.2d 334 (2d Cir. 1970), revd. on other grounds, 406 U.S. 
759 (1972), limited the effect of the statute to cases where the nationalizing sover• 
eign attempted to market the American firm's property and some phase of that trans-
action took place in the United States. 
93. 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897). 
94. 168 U.S. at 254. 
95. See United States ex rel. Steinvorth v. Watkins, 159 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1947); 
United States ex rel. Von Heymann v. Watkins, 159 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1947). 
96. See Holzer v. Deutsche Reichsbabn-Gesellschaft, 277 N.Y. 474, 14 N.E.2d 
798 (1938). 
97. 46 Ariz. 311, 50 P.2d 878 (1935). 
98. 46 Ariz. at 319, 50 P.2d at 88. 
99. See Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 293 F. Supp. 892 (S.D.N.Y. 
1968), modified as to damages, 433 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1970), where the court deter-
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the sovereign itself within its own territory. As the Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit has stated: 
The underlying thought expressed in all the cases touching upon 
the Act of State Doctrine is a common-sense one. It is that when 
a foreign government performs an act of state which is an accom-
plished fact, that is when it has the parties and the res before it and 
acts in such a manner as to change the relationship between the 
parties touching the res, it would be an affront to such foreign gov-
ernment for courts of the United States to hold that such act was a 
nullity.100 
Conversely, American courts have not permitted invocation of 
the doctrine where the sovereign acts either were intended to have 
extraterritorial effects or required completion beyond the sovereign's 
territorial limits. Thus, in Tabacalera Severiano Jorge, S.A. v. 
Standard Cigar Co., 101 the original owners of cigar companies expro-
priated by the Cuban government were allowed to recover payments 
for shipments of cigars since the accounts receivable for the sales 
had their situs in the United States at the time of the expropriation. 
Similarly, owners of confiscated Cuban property have been permit-
ted to retain rights to United States trademarks, 102 and an original 
owner of paintings confiscated by the German government suc-
ceeded in efforts to replevy them because the act of confiscation had 
not been effectuated within German territory.103 
Although an Arab sovereign's "acts" of creating official boycott 
offices within the state bureaucracy, refusing to import or export, and 
denying investment privileges within the state's territory might, if 
taken alone, be considered appropriate for invocation of the act of 
state doctrine, such acts cannot properly be analyzed apart from the 
acts of threatening American companies with reprisals and ordering 
American companies not to deal with Israel or blacklisted parties. 
The boycott decisions and enforcement procedures conducted within 
the territory of Arab sovereigns must be viewed as integral parts of 
the Arab policy of coercion that is intended to have effects within 
the United States and that is in fact dependent upon such effects 
mined that a fundamental condition for application of the doctrine is that the foreign 
state have a clearly recognizable jurisdictional basis for its action, usually a territorial 
one. The court acknowledged, however, that "the mere fact that the foreign state's 
act, in addition to regulating matters within its territorial jurisdiction, may have some 
indirect impact outside its territory, does not preclude our treatment of it as an 'act 
of state.'" 293 F. Supp. at 911. See also Naamloze Vennootschap Suikerfabriek 
"Wono-Aseh" v. Chase Natl. Bank of City of N.Y., 111 F. Supp. 833, 841 (SD.N.Y. 
1953). 
100. Tabacalera Severiano Jorge, S.A. v. Standard Cigar Co., 392 F.2d 706, 715 
(5th Cir. 1968). 
101. 392 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1968). 
102. tSee, e.g., Maltina Corp. v. Cawy Bottling Co., 462 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1060 (1972). 
103. See Menzel v. List, 49 Misc. 2d 300, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804 (Sup. Ct. 1966). 
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for its success. -Since the sovereign acts of the Arab boycott are un-
like the acts that have traditionally triggered the act of state doctrine, 
the parties to the boycott should not be permitted to escape the appli-
cation of United States antitrust laws merely because of the conspira-
torial involvement of Arab sovereigns. 
This conclusion is strongly buttressed by an analysis of the poli-
cies that the act of state doctrine is intended to effectuate. One of 
the primary purposes of the doctrine is to prevent "embarrass[ment 
to] the conduct of foreign relations."104 In cases where the doctrine 
has been invoked, the embarrassment avoided by judicial abstention 
only concerned American foreign relations with a single nation: Ab-
stention had no significant impact upon relations with other states. 
In contrast, the Arab boycott involves American foreign relations not 
only with the Arab bloc but also with Israel. While both parties are 
hostile to each other, both are generally friendly to the United States. 
The refusal of American courts to apply the antitrust laws to the boy-
cott would have a substantial impact on United States-Israeli relations 
since it would amount to the selection of a policy favorable to the 
Arab states. Since application of the doctrine will not promote inter-
national comity and will not avoid embarrassing the United States, 
American courts should not abstain from adjudicating boycott-related 
disputes. More importantly, most cases that have invoked the act 
of state doctrine have involved acts that neither affected fundamental 
American interests nor clearly violated United States laws.106 In 
contrast, the Arab boycott interferes substantially with the operation 
of the American economy in violation of the clearly articulated poli-
cies of the Sherman Act. Judicial abstention is not warranted when 
its consequence is to permit such pervasive and unprecedented intru-
sion into American economic affairs. 
C. Sovereign Compulsion 
A final defense that may be raised by some parties to the boy-
cott is the doctrine of sovereign compulsion.106 Consideration of the 
applicability of this defense in the Arab boycott context is particu-
larly important because of its potential availability to American par-
104. First Natl. City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 765 
(1972). 
105. For example, the seizure of American property abroad without compensa-
tion, although contrary to American public policy, is not clearly violative of either 
international or American law. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 
398, 428-30 (1964). Moreover, the cases where the act of state doctrine has been 
invoked in the antitrust context have not involved concerted conspiracies by foreign 
sovereigns designed expressly to intimidate American businesses. See American 
Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 ( 1909); Occidental Petroleum Corp. 
v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 1971). 
106. On the nature and scope of the doctrine generally, see Note, Development 
of the Defense of Sovereign Compulsion, 69 MICH. L. RF.v. 888 (1971). 
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ticipants who are clearly not shielded by either sovereign immunity 
or territorial limitations of the antitrust laws. 
Courts have applied the doctrine of sovereign compulsion to 
cases in which the foreign nation requires the defendant to engage 
in activities within the sovereign's territory that are violative of 
United States antitrust laws. In particular, courts have applied the 
doctrine where the foreign nation's laws directly mandate the de-
fendant to commit the illegal acts. Often, courts applying the doc-
trine in this manner will enjoin the defendant from entering into 
combinations violative of the antitrust laws but will limit the injunc-
tion so as not to require the defendant "to do, or omit to do, any 
act in a foreign nation in violation of any law or decree of any court 
of competent jurisdiction of said foreign nation . . . ."107 
Courts have also applied the sovereign compulsion doctrine in 
a few cases in which the defendant was threatened with termination 
of its business interests or expropriation of its assets if it transgressed 
sovereign regulations in order to comply with the antitrust laws. 
The most recent application of the doctrine in this situation was in 
Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo Co.108 There, 
a ministry of the government of Venezuela had ordered Superior Oil 
of Venezuela, a concessionaire regulated by Venezuelan laws, to 
terminate oil sales to a particular New Jersey refinery.109 The court, 
concluding that Superior could escape application of United States 
antitrust laws by invoking the doctrine of sovereign compulsion, 
stated: "When a nation compels a trade practice, firms there have 
no choice but to obey. Acts of business become effectively acts of 
the sovereign. The Sherman Act does not confer jurisdiction on 
United States Courts over acts of foreign sovereigns."110 In both 
United States v. Gulf Oil Corp.111 and United States v. Standard Oil 
Co. (New Jersey)112 the courts took a similar approach. In those 
cases, the defendants were enjoined from entering into any agree-
ments or combinations to fix prices, divide markets, or allocate pro-
duction with any competitors engaged in the production, refining, 
distribution, or sale of petroleum products. However, both injunc-
tions were tailored to be inapplicable · 
,[w]here the combination ... is participated in ... pursuant to 
request or official pronouncement of policy of the foreign nation 
or nations within which the transactions which are -the subject of 
107. United States v. American Type Founders Co., 1958 Trade Cas. 74,203, 
74,207 (D.NJ. 1958). See also United States v. American Smelting & Ref. Co., 
1957 Trade Cas. 73,398, 73,402 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); United States v. United Fruit 
Co., 1958 Trade Cas. 73,790, 73,901 (E.D. La. 1958). 
108. 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970). 
109. 307 F. Supp. at 1293. 
110. 307 F. Supp. at 1298. 
111. 1960 Trade Cas. 77,344 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). 
112. 1960 Trade Cas. 77,335 (S.D.N.Y, 1960). 
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such combinations take place, or of any supranational authority 
having jurisdiction within such nation or nations; and where failure 
to comply with which request or policy would expose ,[the defend-
ants] to the risk of •the present or future loss of the particular busi-
ness in such foreign nation or nations which is the subject of such 
request or policy.113 
Significantly, these cases all involved corporations engaged in the 
development and marketing of natural resources. Such firms are pe-
culiarly dependent upon the regulation of foreign nations and thus 
are uniquely subject to the demands of the territorial sovereign. 
Moreover, the activities of Superior Oil, Standard Oil, and Gulf Oil 
were all conducted primarily within the sovereign's terrtiorial lim-
its.114 The coercion to which American participants in the Arab 
boycott are subject differs substantially from the coercion that justi-
fied application of the sovereign compulsion defense in these cases. 
American firms are not directly mandated by the laws of Arab states 
to cqmply with the boycott. Nor do the vast majority of American 
firms have vital assets or business interests within the Arab states 
that are threatened by the boycott.115 Finally, and most importantly, 
the conduct demanded of American firms has no substantial terri-
torial nexus with the Arab nations. The acts of American firms that 
participate in the boycott occur largely within the United States. 
Although American companies may incur economic reprisals for 
noncompliance with the boycott, they are not compelled to comply. 
They retain the choice of obeying the antitrust laws and sacrificing 
optimal profits. Similar economic coercion was held not to be a de-
fense against application of the antitrust laws in United States v. 
Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, lnc.116 In Watch-
makers, the court held that a "convention" among the various ele-
ments of the Swiss watch industry, pursuant to which the participants 
limited their sales to United States manufacturers and importers, and 
which bound both United States companies and the~ Swiss subsidi-
aries, was an unreasonable restraint of trade. Recognizing that the 
Swiss government supported such restrictive practices in the watch 
industry, the court nonetheless indicated that the defense could not 
be invoked in the absence of "direct foreign governmental action 
compelling •the defendants' activities. "117 While the court did not 
113. 1960 Trade Cas. at 77,349. 
114. The court in United States v. United Fruit Co., 1958 Trade Cas. 73,790, 
73,801 (E.D. La. 1958), emphasiz.ed that the doctrine applies only to acts in coun-
tries other than the United States. 
115. Oil companies are the most obvious examples of firms whose assets would 
be subject to expropriation for failure to comply with the boycott. For an approach 
to the sovereign compulsion defense that takes the threat of extreme economic loss 
into account, see text at notes 126-27 infra. 
116. 1963 Trade Cas. 77,414 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), modified, 1965 Trade Cas. 80,490 
(S.D.N.Y. 1965). 
117. 1963 "I:'rade Cas. at 77,456-57. 
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clearly define the type of compulsion that would serve as a defense 
to application of the antitrust laws, it indicated specifically that cer-
tain activities are not encompassed by the defense: "The arguments 
of business necessity and foreign trade conditions . . . cannot immu-
nize the restraints imposed by [the defendants] upon United States 
commerce."118 The court emphasized that "[i]f such arguments 
were accepted by the courts, the American antitrust laws would be-
come a 'dead letter.' "119 This result is consistent with a number 
of domestic cases that have refused to recognize a defense of eco-
nomic coercion when defendants participated in a boycott against a 
primary target only to avoid becoming the object of a secondary boy-
cott.120 
Only one case--lnteramerican121-has extended the doctrine of 
sovereign compulsion to economic coercion under circumstances 
similar to the Arab boycott. The court there permitted the Amoco 
Trading Company (Amoco), an American corporation that served 
as middleman between Superior Oil and the New Jersey target, to 
invoke the defense even though the· only possible consequence of 
noncompliance with the Venezuelan directive was a loss of profit op-
portunities for Amoco and even though Amoco, unlike Superior Oil, 
was not engaged in activities within Venezuelan territory .122 In so 
applying the doctrine, the court drew no distinction between the na-
ture of the coercion exerted upon each defendant. Because such 
application of the doctrine is unsupported by other precedent, a fact 
that the court failed to recognize, lnteramerican does not provide 
substantial authority for recognizing a defense of sovereign compul-
sion for all defendants subject to economic pressures by a foreign 
nation. 
118. 1963 Trade Cas. at 77,457. 
119. 1963 Trade Cas. at 77,457. 
120. Thus, in United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948), 
in which the defendant movie producers and distributors, who had discriminated 
against small independent exhibitors, were found in violation of the Sherman Act, 
the Supreme Court noted: ''There is some suggestion ... that large exhibitors with 
whom defendants dealt fathered the illegal practices and forced them onto the de-
fendants . . • • [T]hat circumstance if true does not help the defendants. For ac-
quiescence in an illegal scheme is as much a violation of the Sherman Act as the 
creation and promotion of one." 334 U.S. at 161. Similarly, in United States v. 
Bausch & Lamb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944), the Court, concluding that 
whether "this conspiracy and combination was achieved by agreement or by acqui-
escence of the wholesalers coupled with assistance in effectuating its purpose [was] 
immaterial," 321 U.S. at 723, held that a conspiracy between a distributor and whole-
salers to maintain retail prices through a distribution system was violative of the 
Sherman Act. See also Klein v. American Luggage Works, Inc., 323 F.2d 787 (3d 
Cir. 1963); The Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368,375 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 
355 U.S. 835 (1957) ("coerc[ion] by economic threats to participate in or aid and 
abet an illegal scheme does not excuse the actor''). 
121. 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970). 
122. 307 F. Supp. at 1296. 
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Nonetheless, under some circumstances, recognition of a sov-
ereign compulsion defense for defendants subject to economic coer-
cion does seem appropriate. One reason for rejecting a defense of 
economic coercion in domestic cases has been the availability to co-
erced parties of adequate legal remedies.123 A party coerced or 
threatened by an American entity can sue for injunctive relief to pre-
vent economic retaliation. It can also notify both the Justice Depart-
ment and the Federal Trade Commission, either of which might 
prosecute the coercers for boycott activities.124 Finally, once the 
threatened party has suffered economic retaliation, it can sue for 
treble damages under the Clayton Act.125 In contrast, a defendant 
subject to economic coercion by foreign entities beyond the reach 
of United States antitrust laws has no such remedies available. Fur-
thermore, in some cases the losses with which a defendant is threat-
ened may be particularly severe. If such losses are tantamount to 
expropriation, the defense of sovereign compulsion may in fact be 
appropriate.126 Therefore, rather than adopt an inflexible rule, 
courts should follow a case-by-case approach in order to give ade-
quate consideration to both the particular hardships to which some 
defendants may be subject and the necessity for strict enforcement 
of the antitrust laws. 
Although use of such a balancing approach in the Arab boycott 
context may shield some American defendants, the general rule 
should remain that the defense of economic coercion is inapposite 
to antitrust violations. Violations of the antitrust laws by American 
firms should be excused only in the exceptional case. Thus, one 
factor that courts should consider is the impact that the threatened 
economic reprisals would have had upon the defendant firms. The 
defense would only be appropriate for companies that would be 
grievously damaged as a result of noncompliance with the boycott. 
Another factor that courts should assess is the history of a firm's com-
123. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 245 F. Supp. 
889, 896 (N.D. Ill. 1965) (participation in a price-fixing scheme not excused by pres-
sures exerted by powerful co-conspirators). 
124. The Justice Department is authorized to proceed under 15 U.S.C. § 4 
(1970); FTC authorization arises under 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1970). 
125. 15 u.s.c. § 15 (1970). 
126. See United States v. Standard Oil Co. (New Jersey), 1960 Trade Cns., 
77,335, 77,340 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (decree enjoining oil companies from combining in 
restraint of trade contained an exception to "no combination" requirement where 
company was forced to comply with a foreign sovereign's request to violate antitrust 
laws or risk ''the present or future loss of the particular business in such foreign na-
tion •.. "); United States v. Gulf Oil Corp., 1960 Trade Cas. 77,344, 77,349 
(S.D.N.Y. 1960). 
The business loss exception recogni7.ed for oil companies is not typical of excep-
tions contained in injunctions affecting less vulnerable industries which generally ap-
ply only where the company is required by foreign law to violate the terms of the 
injunction. See, e.g., United States v. American Smelting & Ref. Co., 1957 Trade 
Cas. 73,402 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). 
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mercial involvement in the Arab world. The defense would only 
be appropriate for companies whose participation in Arab economic 
affairs antedates the recent intensification of boycott pressures. It 
would certainly be an inappropriate defense for a firm that has never 
done business· with Arab nations but that now seeks Arab petrodol-
lars and is willing to participate in the boycott in order to obtain 
them.121 
A final factor that courts should consider is the nature of the con-
duct that American firms perpetrate in compliance with Arab pres-
sures. Courts should be extremely reluctant to apply the defense 
when the defendant's conduct is directed against other American 
companies. For example, an American contractor that discriminates 
among subcontractors on the basis of their compliance with the boy-
cott should only be allowed to invoke the defense when the other 
factors weigh heavily in his favor. Moreover, the defense should 
never be permitted when an American firm is pressured to engage 
in activities that transgress fundamental American political and social 
values. For example, a defendant should not be permitted to invoke 
the defense when it has pressured another American company into 
dismissing Jewish executives or ending "Zionist'' political affiliations. 
Such activities intrude too substantially into American domestic af-
fairs to be tolerated under any circumstances. 
ill. PROPOSALS FOR LEGISLATIVE CHANGE 
This Note has attempted to demonstrate that current American 
law can be used to combat the Arab boycott. However, despite the 
fact that the existing law seems sufficient to deal with the boycott, 
new congressional action is warranted to clarify ambiguous principles 
that might engender judicial confusion in this relatively untested area 
of antitrust litigation. One bill recently introduced in Congress, 
H.R. 5246,128 would, if enacted, impose criminal and civil penalties 
upon companies that employ economic··means to coerce other firms 
to discriminate against Americans because of religion, race, national 
origin, or lawful support for or trade with another country .129 In 
addition, the bill proposes sanctions against any individual or busi-
ness entity that, in response to coercion or in order to avoid economic 
reprisals, cooperates with or participates in an illegal boycott, even 
if "the coercion is exerted by a foreign government or by a business 
127. This should bold true as well for companies with long-established business 
ties in the Arab world that seek to expand their economic relations by terminating 
dealing with Israel. 
128. 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). 
129. H.R. 5246, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 246(c) (1975), provides: "Whoever wil-
fully violates subsection (a) shall be fined not to exceed $100,000, or imprisoned not 
to exceed three years, or both if an individual, or fined not to exceed $1,000,000 if 
any person other than an individual." 
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enterprise not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States."180 
Commendably, the bill would prohibit the use of coercion by one 
American company against another. It also would clearly provide 
that boycott activities can be illegal even if not motivated by a com• 
petitive purpose, that extraterritorial boycott behavior can be 
reached by the antitrust laws, that the sovereign compulsion defense 
does not bar actions against American businesses complying with the 
boycott, and that foreign corporations, such as the Kuwait Interna• 
tional Investment Company, cannot invoke the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity.l31 Thus, if enacted, H.R. 5246 would ensure application 
of the antitrust laws to all American and some foreign participants 
in the Arab boycott. 
Although the bill would be an effective means of curtailing the 
influence of the Arab boycott on American economic affairs, it is 
submitted that one modification may be warranted. The present bill 
would prevent courts from recognizing the defense of sovereign com• 
pulsion for American defendants. As indicated previously, 132 courts 
should be permitted to recognize the defense in those extraordinary 
cases in which the defendant is threatened with grievous financial 
loss and the impact of the defendant's conduct on the American 
economy is minimal. 
In addition to enacting legislation to clarify extant antitrust laws, 
Congress must also consider enacting legislation to prohibit Ameri• 
can companies from furnishing any trade information in response to 
questionnaires distributed by the Arab League Boycott Office.183 
Proscription of compliance with Arab information demands would 
substantially impair the effectiveness of the boycott machinery and 
would help avert the insidious intrusion of Arab economic power 
into American business practices. If such a law were enacted, no 
firms could legally respond to Arab questionnaires and silence there• 
fore could no longer be construed as a "pro.Zionist" stance triggering 
economic reprisals. If the Arabs are denied the information neces• 
sary to compile a blacklist, American firms might be encouraged to 
exercise their freedom of choice in international commercial affairs. 
Whatever course is chosen, the American legal system must re• 
spond to the pressures and dangers of the Arab boycott. Such an 
intrusion into American economic life and society is intolerable. 
The courts are fully equipped under existing law to take strong ac• 
130. H.R. 5246, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 246(b) (1975). 
131. H.R. 5246, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 246(h) (2) (A) (1975), expressly de-
fines "business enterprise" as any person "whose purposes, functions, and activities 
taken as a whole, customarily are attributable to and carried on by private enterprise 
for profit in this country, even if such person is wholly owned by a government and 
no part of its net earnings inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or in-
dividuals . • . ." 
132. See text at notes 123-27 supra. 
133. See note 4 supra. 
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tion against the boycott. Even so, congressional action is desirable 
since legislation could clarify ambiguous legal concepts that, if misin-
terpreted, might impair the ability of courts to deal effectively with 
the Arab boycott. Moreover, congressional action would symbolize 
a national determination to fight back against international economic 
coercion. 
